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Abstract—The increasing adoption of Internet-of-Things (IoT)
devices present new challenges to digital forensic investigators
and law enforcement agencies when investigation into cybercrime
on these new platforms are required. However, there has been no
formal study to document actual challenges faced by investigators
and whether existing tools help them in their work. Prior
issues such as the correlation and consistency problem in digital
forensic evidence have also become a pressing concern in light
of numerous evidence sources from IoT devices.
Motivated by these observations, we conduct a user study with
39 digital forensic investigators from both public and private
sectors to document the challenges they faced in traditional and
IoT digital forensics. We also created a tool, STITCHER, that
addresses the technical challenges faced by investigators when
handling IoT digital forensics investigation.
We simulated an IoT crime that mimics sophisticated cy-
bercriminals and invited our user study participants to utilize
STITCHER to investigate the crime. The efficacy of STITCHER is
confirmed by our study results where 96.2% of users indicated
that STITCHER assisted them in handling the crime, and 61.5%
of users who used STITCHER with its full features solved the
crime completely.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is of paramount importance for all digital systems
and the emergence of Internet-of-Things (IoT) technology has
attracted new adopters and adversaries. It is reported that
attacks on IoT devices have increased by more than 300% in
the first half of 2019 [1], demonstrating that IoT has become
a favorite target by advanced adversaries and cybercriminals
alike. The financial damage caused by cybercrime has been
estimated to hit US$6 trillion by the year 2021 [1]. Thus, it
is imperative that Digital Forensics Investigators (DFI) and/or
Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA) can address and investigate
these emerging forms of cybercrime, just as how they handle
such forms of cybercrime on traditional computer systems by
performing digital forensics and analyzing digital evidence.
However, the domain of IoT digital forensics is immature and
requires further work. For example, there has been research
on identifying some sources of evidence that can be retrieved
from IoT devices [2]. Unfortunately, inadequately trained DFI
may not be familiar with how IoT devices and smart homes are
structured, hence affecting how IoT evidence types could be
classified and presented in reports or courts of law. This could
*This work was done when Chundong worked in Singapore University of
Technology and Design.
cause unnecessary confusion to judges, lawyers or clients as
there is no consistent way in which evidence are presented.
The heterogeneity of IoT devices also brings in an increased
amount of evidence sources for DFI and/or LEA to correlate.
It is not trivial to determine the root cause of issues
mentioned in the preceding paragraph. It could be due to
a lack of awareness by device manufacturers who did not
design their products securely, hence resulting in security
issues such as leaving private keys embedded in firmware [3].
Moreover, a lack of user awareness and device support to
patch vulnerabilities in IoT devices provide cybercriminals
ample opportunities to compromise such devices. Technical
challenges faced by DFI or LEA when they have to investigate
IoT related crimes play a major role as well. The inability
to effectively investigate IoT related crimes and attacks only
encourages adversaries and cybercriminals to exploit such
opportunities. Gaining financial rewards while committing a
crime, and yet not be prosecuted or identified in a timely fash-
ion is attractive for adversaries and organized crime syndicates.
While research in digital forensics on IoT devices is grow-
ing, there are still gaps in capabilities required by DFI. Prior
research has identified challenges in the digital forensics do-
main [4], but there has been no formal survey directed towards
DFI that investigate the challenges they face, especially in
the area of IoT digital forensics. Although some existing
work addresses the problem of automating forensic evidence
discovery and correlation [5], it was limited only to traditional
computer systems rather than IoT devices.
Based on the issues we have highlighted, we conducted
a survey and user study with 39 DFI from both public
and private sectors to concretely and comparatively identify
current challenges they face in both traditional and IoT digital
forensics. The identified challenges will serve as a guideline
for possible future research work on IoT digital forensics.
Additionally, stakeholders who are looking into creating an
IoT digital forensics capability in their respective organizations
can utilize the identified challenges to plan or obtain the
necessary resources to secure success. Finally, the challenges
also motivated us to create a tool, STITCHER. STITCHER
is an automated evidence classification and correlation tool
designed to assist DFI in IoT digital forensics. When re-
trieved IoT evidence such as firmware images, network packet
captures and system processes are provided to STITCHER, it
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classifies the evidence based on a combination of relevant
international ISO standards (ISO 27050-1:2019 [6] and ISO
30141:2018 [7]). STITCHER then processes the evidence and
correlates matching data points within the evidence, and finally
outputs the results to DFI. With the assistance of STITCHER,
DFI are empowered to classify and analyze multiple evidence
sources in a shorter amount of time, and thus solving cases in
a more timely fashion.
The contributions of our research are summarized as fol-
lows:
1) We present the current forensic challenges faced by 39
DFI coming from both public and private sectors. The
survey results consists of 1) current challenges faced in
traditional digital forensics, 2) challenges faced in IoT
digital forensics and 3) challenges faced in a simulated
IoT crime that mimics sophisticated cybercriminals.
2) We develop and present a tool, STITCHER, aimed to assist
DFI in mitigating challenges they face in IoT digital
forensics. STITCHER will aid DFI in classifying, pro-
cessing and correlating IoT forensic evidence. Baseline
data, or known good data are also accepted to strengthen
correlation between evidence sources; and
3) We demonstrate the efficacy of STITCHER by presenting
the results of our user study participated by 39 DFI. In
the user study, DFI were invited to use STITCHER to
classify, process and correlate digital evidence retrieved
from a simulated IoT crime that mimics sophisticated cy-
bercriminals. The efficacy of STITCHER is demonstrated
by our study results where 96.2% of users indicated
that STITCHER assisted them in handling the crime, and
61.5% of users who used STITCHER with its full features
solved the crime completely.
For reproducibility and advancing the research in IoT digital
forensics, our tool and experimental data are publicly available
at: https://github.com/poppopretn/Stitcher.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we present the background of the paper. In Section III, we
detail the design of our experimental infrastructure and user
study. In Section IV, we show the design of STITCHER.
In Section V, we present the results of our user study. In
Section VI, we highlight the limitations of our research and
STITCHER. In Section VII, we summarize current related
work. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND
IoT devices are getting increasingly popular and ubiquitous
in homes, offices and critical infrastructure such as water
and electricity plants. The adoption of IoT devices has led
to increased productivity and potential cost savings, but also
presents a new paradigm of challenges to DFI and LEA as
such devices become a new target for criminal activities.
Cybercriminals and state-sponsored actors could attempt to
backdoor devices via their update mechanisms [8] or exploit
design flaws in devices to perpetrate attacks [3], [9].
The digital forensics landscape appears to be getting by with
the plethora of open-source and commercial tools available
to DFI and LEA to use such as Volatility [10], Rekall [11],
Autopsy [12], The Sleuth Kit [13], AccessData Forensic Toolkit
(FTK) [14] and Encase Forensic [15]. Moreover, there are also
valuable guidance of digital forensic and various artifacts on
traditional computer systems [16]. However, these resources
were mostly intended for traditional digital forensics. There are
multiple difficulties that have plagued DFI in their investiga-
tion efforts, especially in emerging technologies. From the user
study we conducted (outcomes are discussed in detail under
Section V-C), major challenges highlighted by DFI include a
lack of training/knowledge in emerging technologies, multiple
evidence sources to examine and correlating those evidence
sources.
A. Types of IoT Evidence
The success of IoT digital forensics is determined by the
availability of accurate evidence sources that can be examined.
Evidence examination consists of preparing storage mecha-
nisms to contain extracted evidence, extraction of relevant
evidence (physical or logical), analyzing evidence for data
points of interest and finally obtaining a conclusion [17]. DFI
should be mindful of factors that can affect the accuracy of
evidence generated by IoT devices, such as time zone settings
and storage location of various log files. To address these
factors, accuracy can be improved by cross-referencing differ-
ent evidence sources, and by ensuring that relevant evidence
sources needed for investigation are identified and collected.
For instance, network activity of an event of interest recorded
in network packet captures can be utilized to correlate log files
that reflect the same event, thus confirming accuracy of the log
files [16]. As part of our research contribution, we identified
possible evidence sources (see Sections II-A1 to II-A3) that
could be examined by DFI for investigation.
While evidence stored on cloud services could also be
used, we did not want to focus on them as access to these
evidence could be challenging and time-consuming due to
legal paperwork. As such, we only focused on evidence that
could be retrieved from the crime scene or system owners. As
illustrated in Figure 1, we identified three sources of evidence
that are useful during IoT digital forensics - 1© firmware
image, 2© network packet capture and 3© system processes.
Smart Home Setup
Internet
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Fig. 1. Common IoT Setup Scenario in Smart Homes
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1) Firmware Image: Firmware images are purpose-built
software operating systems that give embedded devices their
functionality. However, unlike conventional operating systems,
firmware images are usually compressed and have to be
extracted by specialized software tools such as binwalk [18].
Depending on whether it is extracted directly from the device
or provided as-is by the manufacturer, firmware images may
contain data that could provide additional context, such as logs
or verbose debug files. When firmware images are unpacked
and extracted, they yield multiple files and directories just
like a traditional operating system such as Ubuntu Linux
or Microsoft Windows. As such, the approach to examine
firmware artifacts is similar to that of a forensic disk image
obtained in a traditional digital forensic case. DFI would
usually be interested in artifacts such as file names, list of file
directories, contents of the file itself (text strings within files)
and file hashes (unique alphanumeric characters generated by
hashing algorithms). However, the process to unpack firmware
images could be confusing and technically complex. Moreover,
there could be some loss of context if the firmware image
was examined statically. For example, if the firmware was
obfuscated, DFI may find it challenging to uncover its original
functionality just by static analysis.
The firmware image of an embedded device can be extracted
via serial connection, Joint Task Action Group (JTAG) in-
terface or downloaded from manufacturers’ support sites (if
they are hosted there). Last but not the least, firmware images
can be retrieved from network packet captures if a firmware
upgrade was performed and the network was configured to
capture network traffic.
2) Network Packet Capture: Network traffic is usually not
captured due to storage limitations and privacy concerns.
Moreover, modern network traffic is often encrypted end-
to-end, and thus may require user authentication and more
implementations such as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) de-
cryption. Despite the minor inconveniences, network packet
captures offer a wealth of information that can be utilized to
accelerate an investigation as the majority of communications
happen over the network. Useful information such as source
and destination IP addresses, hardware addresses, source and
destination port numbers, protocols and data payloads are
traceable and retrievable from network packet captures. By
having visibility of what had happened in the network, im-
portant artifacts such as Command and Control (C2) traffic
from backdoored devices or malicious traffic targeted towards
devices can be observed.
For more advanced attack vectors such as self-deleting
malware after establishing a connection or exfiltrating data,
their presence can still be inferred from captured network
traffic despite the absence of the original file. Investigating port
numbers could yield useful information as using the repeated
use of a same port number might indicate the presence of a
C2 channel. Additionally, well known default port numbers
such as port 4444 used by exploitation frameworks like
Metasploit [19] could be revealed as well.
Network packet captures can be obtained by enabling port
mirroring on networking devices and plugging in hardware
sniffers such as network taps. Alternatively, commercial so-
lutions such as Gigamon [20] and Riverbed [21] can provide
these types of network capture capabilities as well.
3) System Processes: To execute their functionality, IoT de-
vices need to execute programs embedded within the firmware,
and thus start the corresponding processes that run those
programs. By examining the list of processes that were active
at the point of time of extraction, it is possible to obtain
a snapshot of what has been exactly happening on the IoT
device. For example, by comparing the list of processes with
a clean build provided by the manufacturer, it is possible to
ascertain foreign processes that are running.
The retrieval of system processes will require DFI to directly
interact with the device and run bash commands such as
ps. While there could be some misgivings about directly
interacting with a system under investigation, it should be
noted that memory forensics on traditional computer systems
also required interaction with the system to obtain more
information. As long as proper documentation of actions and
the resulting evidence generated were kept, DFI will be able to
have insights on what could have transpired on the IoT device.
B. Correlation and Consistency Problem
DFI face the challenge of correlating multiple sources of
evidence, and also analysing the evidence for consistency [4].
With the growth in usage of IoT devices, DFI can anticipate
efforts required for correlation and consistency of digital
evidence to grow exponentially when cybercrime occurs on
IoT devices.
This presents a huge administrative and technological gap
for DFI and LEA when they are faced with cybercrimes
involving IoT devices. For example, traditional digital forensic
techniques such as disk imaging and live memory analysis
are applicable for investigation on cybercrime for conventional
computer systems. Such techniques are also possible on smart-
phones via specialized hardware and software tools such as
Cellebrite [22]. However, most IoT devices have components
soldered together without standard ports present on computers
and smartphones. In most cases, access to serial or JTAG
interfaces often require disassembly of the IoT device. As
such, traditional digital forensic techniques highlighted earlier
cannot be executed. The challenges are further exacerbated
by unfamiliarity with IoT devices due to the heterogeneity
of devices and potentially large amounts of evidence sources
to be examined, leading to longer investigation efforts, gaps
in evidence collection and spiralling backlogs of cases to
investigate. Standard evidence documentation, procedures and
investigation workflows that depend on such techniques will
thus also become invalid.
C. Addressing Challenges in IoT Digital Forensics
DFI in LEA or private companies trawl through literature to
properly classify multiple evidence sources in an internation-
ally agreed convention. As IoT is an emerging area, clients and
legal courts may struggle to understand the architecture of an
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IoT set-up. Without a proper nomenclature, valuable evidence
may be at risk of being inadmissible in a court of law.
Based on the scenario highlighted above, suppose a tool has
been developed to address the challenges. The DFI is provided
with a number of IoT evidence sources to examine and exe-
cutes the said tool. The provided evidence is classified based
on internationally agreed standards which will aid him/her in
reducing time required for report writing later and reducing
ambiguity if presentation of evidence in a court of law is
required. After evidence classification, the evidence is parsed
so that the correlation algorithms can correlate various data
points that appear consistently in the evidence sources. Finally,
the correlation algorithms correlate the various data points that
are related and present them to the DFI. After examining the
output, the correlated data points in various evidence sources
help the DFI stitch together seemingly disparate data points
and reveal the crime that occurred, leading to the resolution
of the case and provision of a satisfactory report promptly.
Suppose we now apply the same scenario based on current
state of the art tools and methodologies. DFI have to manually
examine the various IoT evidence sources that were provided.
A long time will be required if a particular evidence source
contains a large number of files and the DFI will have to rely
on personal experience if no further details about the crime
are provided. All evidence sources have to be cross examined
for data points that turn up and cross referenced to see if
any potential criminal activity occurred, which could take a
few days to complete. Finally, as IoT is an emerging area and
there has been no prior cases, the DFI will require much more
time (as compared to the situation in the previous paragraph)
to solve the case and provide a satisfactory report.
III. INFRASTRUCTURE AND STUDY DESIGN
We present the design of our infrastructure and study that
would be instrumental in our experiments and research.
A. Research Questions (RQ)
We had two main objectives in the User Study. Firstly,
we wanted to profile the DFI work experience and training
received, along with challenges they faced in traditional and
IoT digital forensics. Secondly, we wanted to evaluate the
performance of a software tool - STITCHER - developed
to address new and existing challenges faced by DFI in
the domain of IoT digital forensics. These objectives were
translated into the following research questions:
RQ1 Background Knowledge: How much does prior
knowledge (such as material learned in Institutions of Higher
Learning (IHL), professional training, and work experience)
help DFI in forensics investigations, especially if they are
faced with new frontiers of digital forensics, such as IoT digital
forensics?
RQ2 Challenges in Traditional Digital Forensics: What
are the top challenges and concerns faced by DFI in the field
of traditional digital forensics right now?
RQ3 Challenges in IoT Digital Forensics: What are the
top gaps, challenges and concerns DFI face in emerging areas,
such as digital forensics on IoT devices?
RQ4 DFI Performance in IoT Digital Forensics: How
do DFI perform when handling new cases such as IoT digital
forensics?
RQ5 Empowering DFI: Would the introduction of a
software tool designed to address the gaps make DFI more
efficient and effective in handling IoT digital forensics?
B. Objects and Infrastructure
In this section, we present the objects and infrastructure that
are utilized in the User Study.
1) Objects: The objects under study consists of multiple
objects that are broadly classified into the following two
categories:
i) Tool: We developed a software tool - STITCHER. To
evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the tool, we
deliberately built three configurations of the tool. The
first configuration was designed for the control group and
to evaluate the current digital forensics landscape. The
second configuration had reduced functionality, while the
third configuration of the tool had all features enabled. A
more detailed explanation of STITCHER can be found at
Section IV.
ii) Digital Evidence: We designed and implemented an
attack scenario that replicates a plausible way malicious
actors could use to compromise a conventional IoT setup.
In this study, the attack scenario chosen was the introduc-
tion of a backdoor into the firmware image, thus allowing
malicious actors to communicate and issue commands
to the IoT device. Moreover, the backdoor is able to
survive reboots and start itself again. We took on the
role of malicious actors, connected to the device using
netcat and simulated interaction with the device by typing
in some Linux commands. The following three types of
digital evidence were obtained from the setup before and
after the compromise: firmware image, network packet
capture, and process list of the IoT device (iSmartAlarm
CubeOne).
2) Infrastructure: The infrastructure under study consists
of specially designed infrastructure as follows:
i) Scenario Infrastructure: With reference to Figure 2, we
utilized a Linux Ubuntu distribution, AttifyOS [23], to
virtualize the firmware of iSmartAlarm CubeOne (ver-
sion 2.2.4.11) via Firmware Analysis Toolkit (FAT) [24].
AttifyOSFirmware Analysis Toolkit
(FAT)
QEMU Router
(Virtualized)
iSmartAlarm CubeOne
2
3
1 Firmware Image
Network Packet Capture
System Processes
Fig. 2. Infrastructure of Scenario
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Using a virtualized infrastructure offers multiple bene-
fits. One advantage is that it reduces the complexity of
firmware modifications as an image file was created by
FAT when the firmware was virtualized. Virtualization
also allowed us to avoid potentially bricking the physical
device in our pursuit to create the attack scenario. This
infrastructure was only used to generate the evidence
(firmware image, network packet captures and process
list) required for the pilot study (see Section III-C) and
user study (see Section III-D).
Backdooring iSmartAlarm CubeOne. By mounting and
modifying the image file used by FAT when virtualizing
the firmware, we tampered with the firmware image
directly. An existing backdoor program written in C lan-
guage [25] was modified and implanted into the firmware.
We also modified the rcS file located inside the /etc_ro/
directory to ensure backdoor persistence is established
upon booting.
Evidence Retrieval. To obtain the firmware image, we
copied the firmware image file used by FAT. The network
packet capture was obtained by running Wireshark on
the network interface of AttifyOS. The process list was
retrieved by connecting to the virtualized firmware from
the backdoor connection and executing the ps command
of Linux to list all running processes. The output was
then saved in a text file output.
ii) Investigation and Analysis Infrastructure: The inves-
tigation and analysis infrastructure consists of a Virtual
Machine (VM) running Ubuntu 18.04.1 as a base op-
erating system. Three VMs were created - each having
the evidence of the attack scenario generated from the
scenario infrastructure and running a different configura-
tion of STITCHER for the purposes of the pilot and user
study. The VMs were loaded individually on different
host machines to be used for the pilot study and user
study.
C. Pilot Study
Pilot studies are vital in identifying blind spots and verifying
that the main study is directed to the right audience. It also
ensures that tasks designed for the main study are clear
to participants. We ensured that the pilot study candidate
had relevant industry experience and prior knowledge before
commencing the pilot study.
During the pilot study, we first conducted a 20 minutes oral
briefing to the candidate to explain the goals of the user study.
Following that, the candidate was given 30 minutes for each
configuration of the tool and attempted to solve the attack
scenario. The candidate was observed closely while solving
the scenario with the different configurations of the tool. Next,
the candidate was presented with a survey to answer targeted
questions with respect to Section III-A and provide feedback
on the tool. Through the pilot study, we are able to confirm that
our scenario was realistic enough and refined our processes by
designing an answer sheet for future participants to fill in their
answers.
D. Main Study: DFI
In this section, we detail the steps taken to conduct the user
study.
Recruitment and Selection: As skilled DFI are partic-
ularly rare, we relied on industry and personal connections
to recruit suitable candidates. The candidates were a mix of
DFI from both public and private sectors based in Singapore.
We informed our point-of-contacts that interested participants
should possess at least 1 of the the 3 following requirements:
1) Studied digital forensics in an IHL.
2) Took professional training and/or possess digital forensics
certifications (e.g. GCFE, GCFA, GNFA, GREM, eCDFP,
EnCE, ACE, etc).
3) Investigated cases where digital forensics was required.
A total of 39 DFI were recruited for the user study.
Tasks: We had a maximum of three participants per
session as this allowed us to observe the DFI whilst they
were trying to solve the scenario. In contrast to the pilot
study, participants were given an extra 10 minutes writing time
to fill up the answer sheet, though they were encouraged to
document any notable observations during the first 30 minutes
time frame. We also ensured that participants did not know
there were actually three different configurations of STITCHER
so as to obtain the best data possible.
Debriefing: The debrief consisted of how the scenario
was constructed and what essential evidence should have been
discovered from the evidence sources given. We highlighted
the main differences of each configuration, and emphasized
that the user study was not meant to formally evaluate techni-
cal competency. Finally, we asked the user study participants
to fill in an online questionnaire indicating their background
in digital forensics, challenges faced in their work and on
IoT forensics, and provide feedback on the tool used (where
applicable, as at least a third of the participants did not use
the tool due to the nature of our study design).
E. Measures of Investigation Performance by DFI
We created the following categories that measured the
performance of participating DFI:
1) Full Solve. Correctly identified most, if not all, of the
evidence from the given evidence sources pertinent to the
scenario. DFI were able to accurately highlight the par-
ticular attack scenario, write a brief report that captures
the factors causing the given attack scenario, supported
by the evidence sources that were identified.
2) Partial Solve. Correctly identified at least half of the
evidence from the given evidence sources pertinent to the
scenario. DFI depicted a partially wrong attack scenario,
but was able to write a brief report that depicts the factors
that caused attack scenario, supported by the evidence
sources that were identified.
3) No Solve. Correctly identified less than half of the
evidence from the given evidence sources pertinent to the
scenario. DFI depicted a wrong attack scenario, and/or
unable to write a brief report that depicts the factors that
5
caused attack scenario. DFI was also unable to process
the raw evidence to establish the circumstances of the
attack scenario.
DFI were categorized based on the answer sheet that was
submitted and visual observations while they were partici-
pating in the user study. To further ensure accuracy of DFI
categorization, answer sheets were reviewed at least twice
after submission by a researcher who possessed all three
requirements that user study participants must fulfil before
being eligible to participate in the user study.
F. Assumptions and Limitations
We made a few assumptions and limitations for the study
design, but these do not impact the usability of the tool or
results of the study. They are as follows:
1) The scenario environment was set up to facilitate the
execution of forensic actions to retrieve evidence.
2) We did not require DFI to ensure they had proper chain of
custody of evidence as their primary role was to interact
with the evidence that was provided.
3) We assumed that little effort is required to retrieve the
process list of the firmware that was running before and
after the compromise. The IoT device must be able to
support direct communication, either via serial or port
connection. In our case, we made use of the established
backdoor connection to obtain the process listing of the
compromised firmware. As we were unable to directly
connect to the iSmartAlarm CubeOne without tampering
the firmware itself, we simulated the process list of
a clean firmware by removing the backdoor process
from the process list obtained when the firmware was
backdoored. The accuracy of process list of a clean
firmware is still maintained - we had investigated the
device thoroughly before embarking on research and
observed no visible backdoors on the original firmware.
Since we tampered with the firmware and already had
visibility on the additional system process we created,
we are confident that the system process list recreated in
this way best represents the processes that were running
on an untampered firmware.
4) We assumed that all evidence was retrieved in a foren-
sically sound manner as STITCHER does not verify the
integrity of evidence provided.
5) We virtualized the IoT device as this was another method
we discovered which could allow us to tamper with the
firmware image in the absence of a zero-day vulnerability.
As such, while it is a slightly unconventional way to gen-
erate the corresponding IoT evidence (firmware image,
network packet capture and system processes), we do
not believe it has caused any bias in the tool evaluation
as DFI work directly with the evidence sources in our
user study. Even if we utilized a zero-day vulnerability
(or a few zero-day vulnerabilities) to generate the same
evidence sources, DFI are still going to use STITCHER
to process the evidence sources in the same manner as
described.
IV. TOOL
With reference to Figure 3, STITCHER operates in three
main ways - classifying evidence, processing evidence sources
to facilitate correlation, and correlating processed evidence
sources.
Stitcher
4.1 Evidence Classification
4.2 Evidence Processing
4.3 Evidence Correlation
Evidence:
Firmware Image
Network Packet Capture
System Processes
2
3
1
Fig. 3. Components of STITCHER
A. Evidence Classification
As digital forensics on IoT systems is an emerging field,
a standardized evidence classification scheme reduces ambi-
guity and provides a globally agreed structure for evidence
presentation and discussion.
TABLE I
EVIDENCE CLASSIFICATION USING ISO27050:2019 AND ISO30141:2018
Types of
Evidence handled
by STITCHER
Classification via
ISO27050-1:2019
Classification via
ISO30141:2018
Firmware Image
(Section 4.2.1)
7.2.2 Active data
7.3.2 Custodian
data source
7.4.2 Native
format
8.2.3.9 Data store
Network Packet
Capture (Section
4.2.2)
7.2.3 Inactive data
7.3.3
Non-custodian
data source
7.4.2 Native
format
8.2.3.8 Network
System Processes
(Section 4.2.3)
7.2.2 Active data
7.3.2 Custodian
data source
7.4.2 Native
format
8.2.3.5 Service
With reference to Table I, the evidence classification is
based on two ISO standards - ISO27050-1:2019 [6] and
ISO30141:2018 [7]. ISO27050-1:2019 has been widely used
as a means to classify traditional digital evidence. However,
ISO27050-1:2019 was primarily developed to classify evi-
dence of conventional computer systems and is inadequate
when IoT evidence is presented. For example, evidence gath-
ered from components such as RAM or hard disks can be
directly referenced to ISO27050-1:2019 (residual data and
active data respectively). However, IoT evidence cannot be
directly mapped to ISO27050-1:2019 without losing context
due to heterogeneity of devices, deployment scenarios and pos-
sible types of evidence that can be retrieved. ISO30141:2018
addresses this gap as it offers multiple views of how an
IoT device is located in the network and interacts with other
components of an IoT setup. Coverage provided by these ISO
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standards helps with reporting despite the heterogeneity of IoT
devices (as shown in Figure 4).
Fig. 4. Evidence Classification of STITCHER
B. Evidence Processing
In this section, we discuss how evidence is processed to
facilitate correlation activities by STITCHER. Evidence pro-
cessing is defined as preparing the evidence in a way that will
allow an investigator to analyze the evidence. With reference
to Figure 5, the evidence that were processed come from three
sources: firmware images, network packet capture and system
processes.
Stitcher
(Evidence Processing)
Evidence:
Firmware Image
Network Packet Capture
System Processes
2
3
1
Input Output
Firmware Image:
- File directories list (fdlist)
- Files list (flist)
- File hashes list (fhlist)
- File strings (fstrings)
Network Packet Capture:
- Top destination port (tdport)
- Destination port list (dplist)
System Processes:
- Process list (plist)
1
2
3
Fig. 5. Overview of Evidence Processing by STITCHER
Firmware Image: Figure 6 shows how the various pro-
cessed evidence related to the firmware image are derived. We
mount the disk image created by FAT after the firmware was
virtualized. Following that, STITCHER processes the image to
obtain the various artifacts such as file directories list (fdlist),
list of files (flist), list of file hashes (fhlist), and file strings
(fstrings). The outputs are saved as text files to be used for
correlation later. If there is a baseline or reference firmware
image available, the same process is executed to obtain the
baseline artifacts (denoted by bfdlist, bflist, bfhlist and bfstrings).
P
ro
ce
ss
in
g
Evidence
Firmware Image
Stitcher
Mount Image
Input
Stitcher (Evidence Processing) 
Extract list of file 
directories
Extract list of files
Extract list of file 
hashes
Extract file strings
Processed Evidence (Output)
File directories list (fdlist)
Files list (flist)
File hashes list (fhlist)
File strings (fstrings)
Fig. 6. Firmware Image Processing by STITCHER
Network Packet Capture: STITCHER also processes the
network packet capture file to obtain the artifacts required
for correlation later. With reference to Figure 7, the list of
destination network ports (dplist) and the top destination port
(tdport) are generated from the source network packet capture.
If there is a baseline or reference network packet capture
available, the same process is executed to obtain the baseline
network artifacts (denoted by bdplist and btdport).
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Fig. 7. Network Packet Capture Processing by STITCHER
System Processes: The list of system processes were
originally in the form of a text file as they already have been
retrieved. As such, they were the easiest to handle and no
further processing was required. The system processes are
denoted by plist (with reference to Figure 5) and baseline or
reference system processes are denoted by bplist.
C. Evidence Correlation
In this section, we explain how the evidence is correlated
after being pre-processed. Evidence correlation is defined as
identifying data points that appear consistently in evidence
sources and such data points are related to each other. There
are two possible types of evidence correlation, one is with
just the gathered evidence. The other is with both the gathered
evidence and baseline data provided by the manufacturer.
1) Gathered evidence: DFI have to examine and assess
whether there is any evidence correlated with each other,
and whether they consistently appear in each of the evidence
source. Based on the attack scenario, DFI are expected to find
the following pertinent evidence that will help them explain
the scenario:
i) Firmware. DFI have to find that a new C program which
was functioning as the backdoor, iSmartAlarmShell, was
inserted into the /sbin/ directory. When iSmartAlarmShell
is examined, it would yield text strings of a shell that is
running over port 8888. Additionally, DFI have to identify
that the string "iSmartAlarmShell" was also inserted in
the rcS file located inside the /etc_ro/ directory.
ii) Network. DFI have to analyze the network packet capture
file and identify that port 8888 was the most active
network port due to the fact that the malicious attacker
was using the port to send and receive data.
iii) Process List. DFI have to identify the presence of the
process iSmartAlarmShell that exists amongst the other
legitimate processes that were running.
Based on the above-mentioned artifacts, DFI have to man-
ually investigate the relationships between processes and file
names, processes and file strings and network port occurrences
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Algorithm 1 Evidence Correlation (Without Baseline)
Input: flist, fstrings, dplist, plist // Processed evidence
Ensure: Correlation of evidence sources
1: for (each port ∈ dplist) do // Iterate through list of ports
and port number is stored as variable port
2: if (port ∈ f strings) then // If port number matches
file strings
3: print port
4: for (each process ∈ plist) do // Iterate through list of
processes and process is stored as variable process
5: if (process ∈ f list ∩ f strings) then // If process name
matches file name in file list and file strings
6: print process
7: exit
with file strings. However, STITCHER automates the investi-
gation by correlating the artifacts to save time. With reference
to Algorithm 1, Lines 1 to 3 searches within the artifacts to
correlate port numbers with file strings. Meanwhile, Lines 4
to 6 searches within the artifacts to correlate process names
with list of files and the respective file strings.
2) Gathered evidence and baseline data: The availability
of a trusted reference point or baseline data, similar to a golden
image, can prove to be very helpful for DFI and even speed up
the investigation process. Such data can usually be requested
from the manufacturer when LEA or DFI request for assis-
tance in solving cybercrime. Investigative workflows such as
comparison of file hashes, file names, file strings and network
communications between the IoT device being investigated on
vis-a-vis a device provided by the manufacturer in an identical
set-up can be done. If baseline data available, the baseline
evidence will be processed in a similar fashion as stated in
Section IV-B. Algorithm 1 will still be executed to correlate
Algorithm 2 Evidence Correlation (With Baseline)
Input: flist, fhlist, dplist, plist, // Processed evidence
bflist, bfhlist, bdplist, bplist // Processed baseline evidence
Ensure: Correlation of evidence sources with baseline
sources
1: if (pdiff ← plist ∩ bplist 6= φ) then // Check difference
between process list and baseline
2: Print pdiff
3: if (f diff ← f list ∩ bf list 6= φ) then // Check difference
between file list and baseline
4: Print fdiff
5: if (fhdiff ← fhlist ∩ bfhlist 6= φ) then // Check difference
between file hash and baseline
6: Print fhdiff
7: if (dpdiff ← dplist ∩ bdplist 6= φ) then // Check difference
between port list and baseline
8: Print dpdiff
9: exit
the scenario evidence, but following that, Algorithm 2 will be
executed to check for differences between processes (Lines 1
to 2), files (Lines 3 to 4), file hashes (Lines 5 to 6) and network
ports (Lines 7 to 8) of scenario and baseline evidence. Figure 8
further demonstrates the implementation of Algorithm 2.
Fig. 8. Correlation of Evidence by STITCHER
STITCHER was made available in 3 different configurations
for the purposes of the User Study. The configurations are as
follows:
1) Configuration 1. No tool is made available to a partici-
pant. Common open-sourced tools such as Wireshark [26]
and a specially crafted help file to offer some tips to
participants were made available.
2) Configuration 2. STITCHER with correlation functional-
ity only.
3) Configuration 3. STITCHER with full functionality (cor-
relation and reporting).
V. STUDY RESULTS
We present the findings of our user study in this section,
and also provide insights to the data we obtained according to
our Research Questions highlighted in Section III-A.
A. RQ1 Background Knowledge
We examine if a participant’s background knowledge (re-
spective categories of DFI user study participants outlined
in Table II) and years of experience made a difference when
solving our scenario. Considering the usage of STITCHER
may affect the outcome, we do not yet distinguish between
the different tool configurations which could be an enabler
in aiding DFI in solving the scenario. This is addressed in
Section V-D and Section V-E.
Based on the information provided by DFI during the
survey, Figure 9 and Figure 10 show how DFI performed
in dealing with the scenario. In summary, 12 DFI achieved
a full solve, 13 DFI achieved a partial solve, while 14 DFI
could not solve the scenario within the given time limit.
We observed that background knowledge does play a part
in DFI performance. The majority of DFI (9 out of 12 DFI)
who achieved a full solve had undergone professional training
and/or worked on cases where digital forensics was required.
Extremely experienced DFI (>5 years experience) were able
to solve the scenario within the given time. Meanwhile, most
of the remaining DFI who had undergone professional training
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TABLE II
BACKGROUND OF DFI THAT PARTICIPATED IN USER STUDY
Category Background
A1 Studied about digital forensics in an IHL
A2
Took professional training and/or possess digital forensics
certifications (e.g. GCFE, GCFA, GNFA, GREM, eCDFP,
EnCE, ACE, etc)
A3 Investigated on cases where digital forensics was required
A4
Studied about digital forensics in an IHL and investigated
on cases where digital forensics was required (A1 and A3)
A5
Took professional training and/or possess digital forensics
certifications (e.g. GCFE, GCFA, GNFA, GREM, eCDFP,
EnCE, ACE, etc), and investigated on cases where digital
forensics was required (A2 and A3)
A6
Studied about digital forensics in an IHL, took professional
training and/or possess digital forensics certifications (e.g.
GCFE, GCFA, GNFA, GREM, eCDFP, EnCE, ACE, etc),
and investigated on cases where digital forensics was re-
quired (A1, A2 and A3)
and/or worked on cases where digital forensics was required
achieved a partial solve in the given scenario.
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Fig. 9. Performance of DFI with respect to Background
Another interesting observation is on DFI that belonged
to Category A1 - DFI who only studied digital forensics in
an IHL. More than half of DFI (12 out of 20) belonging to
this category could not solve the scenario within the given
time. This is due to the fact that IoT digital forensics is still
an emerging area and IHL curriculum possibly do not cover
IoT digital forensics. IHL digital forensics curriculum is also
varied and it is possible that DFI learnt limited skills as they
are ultimately constrained by the time and syllabus of the
module. For example, certain IHLs may only teach theoretical
aspects and assess knowledge via examinations, while other
IHL assess student knowledge via hands-on examinations or
projects.
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Fig. 10. Performance of DFI with respect to Years of Experience
B. RQ2 Challenges in Traditional Digital Forensics
One of our contributions through this paper was to survey
and present the current challenges faced by DFI when they
had to carry out traditional digital forensics work. After some
background research, we summarized the potential challenges
in Table III.
TABLE III
CHALLENGES FACED BY DFI IN TRADITIONAL DIGITAL FORENSICS
Category Challenges in Traditional Digital Forensics
B1 Multiple evidence sources to examine
B2 Multiple evidence sources to correlate activity
B3 Creating an accurate and factual report
B4 Not enough training/knowledge
B5 Multiple evidence sources to process
B6 Classifying evidence to present them to client/report/courtof law
B7 Working with tight deadlines to solve cases in the shortestamount of time
B8 Not enough manpower to work on cases
B9 Others
We present the challenges faced by DFI individually based
on their feedback in Figure 11, a consolidated view of the chal-
lenges is summarized in Figure 12. Most DFI had indicated
that they faced more than 5 challenges in traditional forensics,
except that DFI #19 and #29 selected only one challenge. For
DFI #12 and #13 who selected B9 (Others), the challenges they
faced were that there were no established general Standard
Operating Procedures (SOP) for handling different types of
cases they had to solve, such as malware and gathering of
evidence. Another challenge they faced was understanding the
environment where the case had happened.
The top 3 concerns highlighted by DFI during the study
were multiple evidence sources to examine (B1), multiple
evidence sources to correlate activity (B2) and creating an
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Fig. 11. Challenges Faced by DFI in Traditional Digital Forensics
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Fig. 12. Challenges Faced by DFI in Traditional Digital Forensics - Consol-
idated View
accurate and factual report (B3). This was in line with our goal
of creating STITCHER, particularly for IoT digital forensics.
C. RQ3 Challenges in IoT Digital Forensics
We also aim to provide another contribution – an insight as
to what challenges DFI are facing right now in the area of IoT
digital forensics. As a litmus test, we asked the participants
to rate their own confidence in handling IoT digital forensics
(with reference to Figure 13) and only a mere 2.56% of DFI
indicated that they were extremely confident.
There are two sources of data that could be analyzed for this:
challenges DFI thought they faced in IoT digital forensics in
the broadest sense (cf. Table IV) and the challenges DFI faced
during the scenario (cf. Table V).
We present the challenges faced by DFI individually based
on their feedback in Figure 14, and a consolidated view of
the challenges is summarized in Figure 15. Only 6 out of 39
DFI (DFI #6, #11, #12, #17, #21 and #29) indicated only one
challenge they would face in a potential IoT digital forensics
case. Around half of the other DFI indicated that there were
more than five challenges that they would face in a potential
IoT digital forensics case. DFI #13 selected “Others” (C9),
Somewhat not confident
35.9%
Extremely not confident
35.9%
Somewhat confident
12.8% Neutral
12.8% Extremely Confident
2.56%
Fig. 13. DFI Confidence in Handling IoT Digital Forensics
TABLE IV
CHALLENGES FACED BY DFI IN IOT DIGITAL FORENSICS
Category Challenges in IoT Digital Forensics
C1 Not enough training/knowledge
C2 Potentially multiple evidence sources to examine
C3 Potentially multiple evidence sources to correlate activity
C4 Working with tight deadlines to solve cases in the shortestamount of time
C5 Potentially multiple evidence sources to process
C6 Creating an accurate and factual report
C7
Classifying evidence (with respect to the context of IoT) to
present them to client/report/court of law
C8 Not enough manpower to work on cases
C9 Others
TABLE V
CHALLENGES FACED BY DFI DURING SCENARIO
Category Challenges in Scenario
D1 Unsure of what to look out for
D2 Unsure of the hypothesis (what had exactly happened)
D3 Difficulty in correlating data points of interest
D4 Unsure of what to include in report
D5
Unsure of how to classify evidence sources for reporting
and presentation to client/court of law
D6 Too many sources of evidence for analysis
D7 There was not enough time to finish analysis of evidence
D8 Others
and the challenge faced was being unable to understand the
specifics of an IoT environment (such as logs not persisting
after reboots and where data could be stored) which is similar
to C1.
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Fig. 14. Challenges Faced by DFI in IoT Digital Forensics
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Fig. 15. Challenges Faced by DFI in IoT Digital Forensics - Consolidated
View
The top four challenges faced by DFI in IoT digital forensics
were not enough training/knowledge (C1), potentially multiple
evidence sources to examine (C2), potential multiple evidence
sources to correlate activity (C3) and working with tight
deadlines to solve cases in the shortest amount of time (C4)
(both C3 and C4 had a tie of 24). It is not surprising to
see C1 be the top challenge selected by DFI (31 out of 39).
This also justifies why our research work is imperative and
timely. As for C2, C3 and C4, they were more of operational
challenges. A tool like STITCHER shall aid them in addressing
such challenges.
The aforementioned challenges are ones that DFI would face
in IoT digital forensics. We now examine what challenges DFI
actually faced in the scenario and if they were correlated with
each other. We present the actual challenges faced for each
DFI in Figure 16, and also provide a consolidated view of the
challenges in Figure 17.
Fewer than half of the DFI faced more than five challenges.
Only 6 out of 39 DFI (DFI #5, #11, #12, #16, #17 and #19)
indicated only one challenge that they faced. DFI #5, #17 and
#23 selected “Others” (D8), and their challenges were being
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Fig. 16. Challenges Faced by DFI During Scenario
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Fig. 17. Challenges Faced by DFI During Scenario - Consolidated View
unable to interpret the evidence initially, no prior knowledge or
training, and the inability to discern key data that were unique
to IoT systems that could be used for digital forensics. DFI
indicated fewer challenges per person in this question, and 13
out of 39 DFI felt that there was not enough time to finish the
analysis of evidence.
The top three challenges DFI faced during the scenario
were being unsure of what to look out for (D1), unsure of
the hypothesis (what had exactly happened) and difficulty in
correlating data points of interest (D3). At a first glance, the
top four challenges listed previously (C1, C2, C3 and C4) are
different from D1, D2 and D3. However, after a closer look, we
determined that they were interconnected. For example, a lack
of training and knowledge certainly leads to an uncertainty of
what to look out for (C1 and D1) in IoT digital forensics cases.
When there were multiple evidence sources to examine and
correlate with tight deadlines, DFI found it hard to correlate
the evidence sources and offer a correct hypothesis (C2, C3,
C4, D2 and D3).
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D. RQ4 DFI Performance in IoT Digital Forensics
In the experiment, we deliberately configured three versions
of STITCHER as we wanted to investigate how DFI performed
with currently available tools (the control group). With refer-
ence to Figure 18, we observed that only 38.5% (4 out of 13)
of the DFI achieved a partial solve. The rest of DFI could not
solve the scenario within the given time. This observation also
corresponds to the challenges highlighted in Section V-C.
No Solve
61.5%
Partial Solve
38.5%
Fig. 18. Performance of DFI (Control Group)
E. RQ5 Empowering DFI
With regards to the results presented in Section V-C and
Section V-D, we now examine if the introduction of a software
tool (STITCHER) designed to address the gaps could make DFI
more efficient and effective in handling IoT forensics. From
the feedback garnered from DFI, 96.2% of users (25 out of
26) indicated that STITCHER truly assisted them in handling
the scenario. With reference to Figure 19, 61.5% of users (8
out of 13) who used Configuration 3 achieved a full solve
and 30.8% of users (4 out of 13) who used Configuration 2
achieved a full solve. DFI who solved the scenario finished
within 25 to 30 minutes (cf. Figure 20), although some DFI
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Fig. 19. Performance of DFI Using STITCHER
completed it in a shorter time. The fastest DFI completed the
scenario in 15 to 20 minutes. This is because the DFI has prior
knowledge or has researched on the area of IoT forensics.
Out of 26 DFI (excluding the 13 from the control group
who used Configuration 1), 9 DFI achieved a partial solve.
Although the partial solve does not capture solving the case
entirely, these DFI could have potentially ended not solving
the case at all without STITCHER.
Could not solve within given time
69.2%
≥25 minutes, ≤30 minutes
25.6%
≥15 minutes, ≤20 minutes
2.56%
≥20 minutes, ≤25 minutes
2.56%
Fig. 20. Time Taken by DFI to Solve Scenario
We also surveyed the extra time potentially needed by DFI
to solve the scenario (cf. Figure 21). More than half of the
DFI indicated that they required more than 20 hours to solve
the scenario. Note that solving of the scenario was limited
to individual work and no team work was allowed, and that
was one reason why DFI picked that choice. Usually, digital
forensics would be a team effort as it is labour intensive and
requires cross-checks. With more knowledge and training as
well as a tool such as STITCHER, we envision that the time
needed by DFI to handle IoT digital forensics cases would
reduce.
>20 hours
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Solved within given time
30.8%
5 hours
12.8%
10
 h
ou
rs
2.
56
%
15
 h
ou
rs
2.
56
%
Fig. 21. Extra Time Needed by DFI to Solve Scenario
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VI. LIMITATIONS
Participants of the user study were only given 30 minutes
to solve the scenario and an additional 10 minutes of writing
time. This could have affected the results of participants
solving the scenario, as given more time, those who partially
solved the scenario could have solved it fully. However, the
participants were working professionals and were unable to
take part in a longer study. Additionally, some participants
treated it as a new challenge to self-assess their skills and
understanding, and thus did not mind the short amount of time
given.
Despite the best efforts to gather a large group for the user
study, we could only gather 39 local DFI from public and pri-
vate sectors. Additionally, due to the constraints of monitoring
user interaction with STITCHER, we did not consider seeking
international DFI to participate in our user study. Thus, our
data are skewed towards DFI based in Singapore and may
not reflect the challenges faced by DFI in other countries.
Although our data is region-specific, the study results and
STITCHER could still be advisable to international DFI or LEA
who are facing similar challenges in IoT digital forensics.
STITCHER is able to work even in the absence of baseline
evidence. However, it is possible that DFI will take a longer
time for analysis of evidence if they do not have a baseline
to refer to. STITCHER only correlates between the firmware
image, network packet capture and system processes and
highlight the data points that consistently appear, but DFI
have to investigate if those were legitimate or malicious in
nature. This issue can be addressed by requesting device
manufacturers for the baseline evidence sources to assist in
investigation. Alternatively, DFI or LEA can also consider
working with device manufacturers to set up a facility or data
repository of baseline evidence gathered from IoT devices.
With the availability of a baseline reference point, DFI can
identify malicious artifacts quickly.
STITCHER only supports the classification and correlation
of firmware images, network packet captures and system
processes currently. Further work will be required to extend the
classification and correlation of other types of digital evidence,
such as digital evidence from the smartphone applications of
IoT devices and data stored in cloud servers. Given more
sources of evidence to correlate, DFI could obtain a more
comprehensive output from STITCHER. However, evidence
sources such as those from the cloud are usually harder and
time consuming to obtain as they would require warrants or
international cooperation from other LEA. Hence, STITCHER
was designed with a focus on evidence sources that could be
directly retrieved from the crime scene.
Finally, STITCHER is not yet compatible with other foren-
sic tools, and also has not yet implemented the Cyber-
investigation Analysis Standard Expression (CASE) and Uni-
fied Cyber Ontology (UCO) as proposed by [27]. We want
to address the capability gap experienced by DFI in terms of
IoT forensics first, and leave the implementation of CASE and
UCO in STITCHER as a future work.
VII. RELATED WORK
Some prior works on correlation in digital forensics have
been explored. Chabot et al. presented a scenario recon-
struction, semantic analysis and expert knowledge approach
coupled with a formal-based timeline reconstruction and in-
cident modelling [28]. Chabot et al. further suggested the
reconstruction and analysis of incidents via an ontology-based
approach [29]. These approaches work well for traditional
investigations based on web browsing or even executable
binaries on computers. However, their proposed correlation
methods are not yet compatible for investigations based on
IoT devices, particularly on digesting evidence sources such
as firmware images and network packet captures. The methods
also do not yet classify IoT evidence sources based on in-
ternationally agreed standards (such as ISO27050-1:2019 and
ISO30141:2018) despite having their own proposed ontology.
Finally, contrary to the aforementioned works, STITCHER has
undergone trials with private and public sector DFI in a user
study based on a realistic scenario emulating advanced adver-
saries. STITCHER was also well-received by the participants,
with 96.2% of the users indicating that it aided them in solving
the case.
Conventional methods such as memory forensics used by
DFI on traditional computer systems are inapplicable to IoT
devices. Case and Richard highlighted that “it was difficult or
impossible to acquire memory samples” as such devices ran on
a wide variety of custom operating systems and the hardware
lacked memory forensics support [30]. The authors were also
of opinion that in the event that memory forensics on such
devices were possible, it would require the use of exploits in
conjunction with tools and thus raising issues on the admis-
sibility of such evidence in court [30]. In particular, we were
also unable to extract any memory sample of iSmartAlarm
CubeOne in our research, and agree that memory forensics on
IoT devices cannot be executed currently.
A few solutions were proposed to address the challenges
of IoT digital forensics. Amato et al. proposed the use of
semantic technologies to correlate digital evidence and touts
benefits such as integration of information, flexibility and
classification [31]. Kebande et al. proposed an integrated
forensic investigation framework for IoT systems and incorpo-
rates several ISO standards in the framework [32]. Although
the paper was comprehensive, it is not trivial to comply
and implement such a framework in current environments
which are already operational or already have had respective
designs finalized. Unfortunately, neither solution offered any
real-world implementation nor experiments were conducted to
demonstrate its viability. As such, they remain as theoretical
suggestions to address the challenges of IoT forensics.
New techniques such as using a multi-objective evolu-
tionary algorithm to increase hardware security have been
proposed to address and reduce the impact of sophisticated
cyber-attacks [33]. By securing hardware and reducing the
attack surface of embedded systems, cybercriminals will face
increased difficulty in exploiting IoT devices and thus IoT
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cybercrime should decrease, giving DFI and LEA a respite.
Unfortunately, real-world implementations of such techniques
by vendors have not been observed.
An interesting research conducted by Xu et al. explored
the usage of attack trees to reconstruct the attack and gather
relevant forensic evidence following the attack path [34].
This approach offers a potentially comprehensive coverage of
forensic evidence and makes reporting intuitive. However, this
method embraces several shortcomings. For example, if the
proposed scenario is not applicable when compared against the
root, the tree has to be rebuilt again to incorporate new scenar-
ios and the corresponding evidence has to be acquired. This
increases the workload for DFI with more time required for
investigation. The generation of attack tree would require DFI
to think like an attacker/criminal, which is at times challenging
for DFI who are new to cybercrime related investigation work.
In addition, the generation of attack trees in the context of IoT
devices may inevitably point to the need for evidence from
cloud service providers or servers located in geographically
different areas with varying legal jurisdictions. Retrieval of
such evidence are challenging for DFI/LEA, and decreases
the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed method.
In 2011, a user study was conducted by Hibishi et al.
to investigate the usability of widely used commercial and
open-source forensic software [35]. The authors found that
users who indicated the various software in the survey often
required a depth of technical knowledge before they could
be used. Moreover, there were also conflicting preferences
highlighted by the participants (a do-it-all tool vs. a tool that
does a particular job extremely well). Our user study differs
by focusing on a wider variety of challenges faced by DFI
including and not limited to forensic tools. We provide an
updated view of challenges faced by DFI in both traditional
digital forensics and IoT digital forensics. We also show how
STITCHER could help DFI in addressing the challenges faced
in IoT digital forensics despite the majority not having much
background in IoT digital forensics.
Servida and Casey investigated on possible forensics ar-
tifacts that could be retrieved from IoT devices and the
corresponding smartphone applications used to control those
IoT devices [2]. The authors argued that further research was
needed in home security systems, smart assistants and smart
firewalls. They also demonstrated that there were forensic
artifacts in IoT devices which could be admissible in court. Fi-
nally, the authors developed plugins to further extend Autopsy,
an open-source digital forensics tool. As current forensic tools
for IoT do not yet classify and correlate IoT forensic evidence,
we believe STITCHER fills this gap and would influence further
research in the area of evidence correlation in IoT digital
forensics.
VIII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We conducted a user study with 39 DFI from both public
and private sectors to present the challenges DFI faced in
traditional and IoT digital forensics. Based on the user study,
we observed the following key findings:
1) Background Knowledge. DFI who only studied digital
forensics in an IHL (Category A1) did not perform well
in the user study. More than half of DFI (12 out of 20)
belonging to this category could not solve the scenario
within the given time.
2) Challenges in Traditional Digital Forensics. The top
challenges highlighted by DFI were multiple evidence
sources to examine, multiple evidence sources to correlate
activity and creating an accurate and factual report.
3) Challenges in IoT Digital Forensics. The top challenges
faced by DFI in IoT digital forensics were not enough
training/knowledge, potentially multiple evidence sources
to examine, potential multiple evidence sources to corre-
late activity and working with tight deadlines to solve
cases in the shortest amount of time.
4) DFI Performance in IoT Forensics. DFI in the control
group could not fully solve our simulated IoT crime. Only
38.5% of DFI in the control group achieved a partial
solve. For the rest of DFI using STITCHER, 96.2% of
DFI indicated that STITCHER assisted them in handling
the crime and 61.5% of DFI using STITCHER with its
full features solved the crime completely.
Our user study has demonstrated that there are multiple
opportunities to enhance the state-of-the-practice in IoT digital
forensics. The learning objectives, syllabus and assessment of
digital forensics modules taught at undergraduate or postgrad-
uate level could be reviewed to include guidance and concepts
of IoT digital forensics so as to better prepare students for a
new paradigm in digital forensics. The identified challenges in
both traditional and IoT digital forensics can serve as potential
research directions for researchers. Finally, we also attempted
to address the consistency and correlation problem in digital
forensics by creating a new tool named STITCHER to classify
and correlate IoT forensic evidence. With the user study and
the tool, we believe that we have lightened the burden of IoT
investigation and challenges faced by DFI and LEA.
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